

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO [REDACTED]

19272

57

Aug 31 3:35 PM '68

Orig: ARA ACTION: CIRCULAR 416

Info:
SS ALL ARA DIPLOMATIC POSTS
G P0447/07260/
SP P0447/07261/
SAL FOR AMERICAN C.
ADPS
CAP
EUR
FE
E
AIDA
P
CU
USIA
INR
RMR

192

Following is summary US views relations Latin American
countries to U.S. and satellites referred to in Secretary's
message.

1. Signature nuclear test ban treaty while first step
ahead in this field does not end cold war. Soviet leaders
continue to

evidence

DECLASSIFIED	
Dept. of State (WUX-82-110)	
By [REDACTED]	NARS, Date 5/21/72

Drafted by: MMartin:pat 8/30/68

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

RA - Edwin M. Martin

Clearance: INR-Mr. Hughes (DS-322),
EUR-Mr. Davis (DS-322)

J. S. [REDACTED] (start) 8/30/68 - Howe
J. M. [REDACTED] Thompson

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "OFFICIAL USE
ONLY" OR "UNCLASSIFIED"

[REDACTED]

XXXXXX evidence uncompromising position on such matters as Berlin and Laos, and have thus far shown no convincing disposition to modify their views on whole range of miscellaneous matters other than limited step contained in present treaty. They continue to make clear their ultimate goal of world communism and advocate what they term "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" and assert they will give material assistance such movements. Cuba which has allied itself with communist camp plays active role in this regard in Latin America. Even if there should in future be some evidence of diminution of Soviet Bloc support for such attacks on free and democratic political and economic systems, there would remain in all countries of Latin America communist parties with varying degrees of indigenous strength desiring to establish totalitarian regimes and hence threats to present political, social and economic systems of countries of Hemisphere. For foreseeable future USSR, XXXXXXXXXX, world communism and local communist parties must continue to be considered in Latin America as enemies both of existing order and of efforts through Alliance for Progress to accomplish major improvements in L.A.

2. Moscow-Peking conflict basically concerns for supremacy in leadership world communist movement although conflict is deeper than just



just tactics and involves national interests. There is no evidence that ultimate purpose of converting world to communism is not still shared by both parties. While intensity propaganda battle between Moscow and Peiping gives impression they differ sharply over tactics, and that Moscow more "peaceful", situation not this simple. We should bear mind relative strengths USSR and Communist China, and that it was USSR which put missiles in Cuba, threatening not only US but LA security. Further, it Soviet Union which has military potential cause crises such areas Berlin. If Soviet policy "peaceful coexistence" viewed this light, it clear that^{at least one} aim of this policy is to lull peoples world into thinking USSR has no ulterior motives. Signing test ban treaty, while it done primarily for other reasons, gives Soviets opportunity proclaim success their "peace policy". US always willing seek solutions problems with USSR so long as no net loss to free world security involved. This has led some to draw conclusion that US and, is prepared make important concessions in order in some senses free world in general, support Soviets against Peiping. This is not true because we still believe ultimate objectives of both are ~~XXXXXX~~ inimical to free world and because we are no more prepared to sacrifice our real interest to Soviets in order to help them with Peiping than we expect they are ready to sacrifice what

they



[REDACTED]

they consider to be their own to us in order to reach agreements. The Sino-Soviet dispute extends into all countries where there are communist or pro-communist parties as both sides attempt to exert their influence and have their policies prevail. It, therefore, obvious that local communist parties, regardless whether they choose "peaceful" Soviet line as opposed "militant" Chicom line, remain agents foreign power, and continue to be instruments in the cold war.

3. US relations with Soviet Union and bloc countries in political, economic and cultural fields have also confused some about position to be taken vis-a-vis local communists and vis-a-vis bloc countries. This latter problem falls basically under three headings of diplomatic relations, trade relations, and cultural relations including exchange of persons. In general, US actions have been directed toward penetrating the Soviet Bloc with our influence. In this connection, should be remembered that as result large Russian and East European immigration US around turn century we have long association these areas. Thus US has latent pool good will these countries as result family ties which we attempting strengthen in pursuit our policy influencing peoples and governments these countries toward more open societies, better informed about conditions in eastern world and peaceful attitudes of free world.

The PL-480

[REDACTED]

The PL-430 assistance we have rendered Poland has as its goals (1) to help that country maintain the degree of independence it has gained from Soviet control; (2) to foster and stimulate further independence; and (3) to assist the maintenance of a Western COMINT presence and of US programs in Poland. If other steps in economic field ~~take~~ take place in future this will occur only where, after most careful consideration we feel advantages to us in breaking through Iron Curtain, outweigh any advantages bloc countries may receive with respect our already open society.

In cultural, educational and technical exchange programs, situation is similar. US carefully plans and supervises exchanges to gain net advantage for us. We are in position to ensure this. In field of civil aviation US is in a position to take full advantage of reciprocity whereas Latin American countries are not.

4. It should be abundantly clear to all that these openings are designed not only to promote friendly relations with the peoples of these areas but also to encourage those peoples to strive toward greater personal freedom and to serve as a favorable influence on the policies of their governments. We are also attempting to encourage national feelings and policies among the smaller Eastern European countries subordinate to the USSR. These policies are underlined by nature of activities undertaken, by policy statements made by US officials,

~~SECRET~~

US officials, by rigorous US government restriction of communists and Soviet Bloc activities in US, by US support of action against communists in third countries, including loss of US lives in combat against communists in Korea, Vietnam and Laos, and by huge expenditures of US taxpayers money in maintaining some million military personnel overseas on borders communist world, ~~REINFORCING EUROPE JACKING SWEDEN BACK~~
Our heavy defense expenditures testify to our determination to keep up our guard and indicate no illusion that cold war has thawed sufficiently to permit us to drop it in the slightest.

5. Most difficult problem in dealing with countries of Latin America will undoubtedly arise on practical questions of political, economic and cultural relations with Bloc countries. It will not be easy to convince them that US can influence Soviets but not vice versa while they cannot. Nevertheless this is what we must seek to do perhaps in low key, but with as much diplomatic skill as possible. It is suggested that in doing so emphasis be put on practical effects in their countries of increased relations rather than on theoretical considerations related to nature of communist doctrine for global Soviet aims. We will try to help you with illustrations from various countries. It may be possible to touch lightly on fact that relative size

and state

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

and state of development of US and USSR plus controls we can exercise over our mutual relations make us less vulnerable than smaller and less developed LA states to Soviet economic pressures and penetration and better able control presence Soviet officials in US on basis reciprocity.

In dealing with question of action against local communists it may be desirable to stress both their threat to local order, stability and freedom and fact they are component part of Soviet imperialism. Latter point should continue to be made with as much practical evidence and support as can be produced to demonstrate their direct ties with and subservience to Moscow.

6. Should not be too difficult for Latin Americans to distinguish relations with Soviet Bloc from those with Cuba where even greater caution and controls are necessary. The Castro regime is an active and present threat in their midst, seeking to destroy their regimes. There is clear evidence of Castro internal tyranny and abolition of liberty, of his firing squads, of his economic failures and of his aggressive purposes and acts in Latin America. Hemisphere is on record with respect these points and incompatibility of communist Cuba with Inter-American system. US has set example of sharp distinction. In

fact

fact US has restricted travel of US citizens to Cuba and stopped US flag carrier flights, not because US security required it -- net effect would probably be a little on other side from strict US standpoint -- but in order to make it easier for Latin Americans to take strong measures which in our view are required for their security.

7. However, we recognize that in end we must probably be prepared to live as gracefully as possible with considerable increase in diplomatic, trade and cultural relations between Latin American countries and those of Soviet Bloc.

8. The problems of relations with Yugoslavia, which we do not consider as part of the bloc, will be dealt with in a separate instruction, related to Tito's forthcoming visit to LA.

GP-2

END

RUSK